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Abstract 
 
 
We show that Treasury security prices in the secondary market decrease significantly 
before subsequent auctions and recover shortly after. This price pattern implies a large 
issuance cost for the Treasury Department, which is estimated to be between 9 and 18 
basis points of the auction size. For example, this cost amounts to over half a billion 
dollars for issuing Treasury notes alone in 2007. Our results appear to be consistent with 
the hypothesis of primary dealers’ limited risk-bearing capacity and the imperfect 
capital mobility of end investors in the Treasury market (e.g., federal agencies, 
sovereign wealth funds, pension funds, and etc.), highlighting the important role of 
capital mobility even in the most liquid financial markets. 
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I. Introduction 
In this paper, we empirically examine how anticipated and frequently repeated supply 
shocks are absorbed in liquid financial markets. In particular, we examine the temporary 
price impacts of Treasury security auctions on the secondary Treasury, repo, and equity 
markets. This may appear as a surprising agenda: Treasury auctions are conducted 
every month, of which the exact dates and amounts are announced in advance, so these 
events are largely anticipated; in addition, Treasury auctions are usually accompanied 
by the maturity of similar Treasury securities, so the net supply effect is likely small. 
Given the size and liquidity of the U.S. Treasury, repo, and equity markets, one might 
expect no appreciable price impacts from these anticipated events.1 In sharp contrast to 
this conventional view, our evidence reveals significant temporary price effects in all 
three markets around Treasury auctions. 
Specifically, we find that Treasury auctions exert significant price pressure in the 
secondary Treasury market during the 5 to 10 days leading up to these auctions and 
that this price pressure gradually dissipates in the subsequent 5 to 10 days. An intuitive 
way to describe this price dip and recovery pattern is to compare Treasury returns 
around auctions: For example, the 5-day cumulative return of the on-the-run 2-year 
Treasury note before the subsequent 2-year note auction is, on average, 8.89 (t=2.93) 
basis points lower than the 5-day post-auction return of the same security.2 Similarly, 
this 5-day return differential is, on average, 22.54 (t=3.67) basis points for 5-year notes 
around subsequent 5-year note auctions, and 23.84 (t=1.78) basis points for 10-year 
notes around subsequent 10-year note auctions. 
These findings have important economic implications. First of all, they suggest 
that the cost of security issuance borne by the Treasury Department is an order of 
magnitude larger than auction markups estimated in prior literature, which compares 
                                                            
1 In 2008, the total size of Treasury securities outstanding is $10 trillion (from Treasury Department 
website), the total U.S. stock market capitalization is $14 trillion (from CRSP), and the estimated size of 
the repo market is over $10 trillion (Gorton and Metrick (2010)). 
2 An on-the-run Treasury security is the most recently issued security of a given maturity. The first off-
the-run and the second off-the-run securities are the second and third most recently issued securities of a 
given maturity, respectively.   
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the auction price with a benchmark price on the auction day, and often finds the 
markup to be around 1 basis point of the auction size.3 Our findings suggest that, 
because of the price impact of Treasury auctions, these benchmark prices on auction 
days are already depressed. Therefore, while the traditional approach is appropriate for 
measuring auction underpricing, it does not reflect the total issuance cost borne by the 
Treasury Department.  
To incorporate price impacts into our cost measure, we take the average price in 
the secondary Treasury market on the tth day before and the tth day after each auction 
as the benchmark price, with t ranging from 1 to 10.4 That is, our measure reflects the 
amount of money the Treasury Department could have saved were it able to issue 
Treasury securities at the secondary market prices several days before and after auctions. 
For t=5, for example, our estimates of Treasury issuance costs for 2-, 5-, and 10-year 
notes are 9.07, 16.81, and 18.43 basis points of the auction size, respectively. According 
to these estimates, the total cost of issuing Treasury notes alone in 2007 is $643 million. 
This cost is likely to be substantially higher in the near future when the U.S. 
government faces an unprecedented budget deficit. While it is by no means clear 
whether part of the estimated cost can be saved through better designs of the Treasury 
selling mechanism, recognizing such a cost is a necessary first step to understand and 
improve its efficiency.5  
Second, our findings suggest that the frictions behind investors’ slow responses to 
demand/supply shocks are of first-order importance even in the most liquid financial 
markets. A simple long-short strategy that exploits these large and reoccurring swings in 
Treasury returns around auction days yields a Sharpe ratio that is higher than many 
well-known asset pricing anomalies, such as currency carry trades and price momentum. 
For example, by going short in the on-the-run 2-year note and long in a duration-
                                                            
3 See, for example, Nyborg and Sundaresan (1996) and Goldreich (2007).  
4 This is likely a conservative estimate since the auctioned security will become “on-the-run” in a few days 
and should be worth more than the soon-to-become-off-the-run note, as suggested by the well-known on-
the-run-off-the-run phenomenon (e.g., Amihud and Mendelson (1991), Krishnamurthy (2002)). 
5 Motivated by our empirical evidence, Jin and Yan (2011) analyze a model of optimal security selling 
mechanism when capital is slow-moving.  
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matched portfolio comprising the on-the-run 6-month Treasury bill and 10-year note 
during the 10 days before each 2-year note auction, and holding reversed positions 
during the 10 days after, an investor can achieve an annualized Sharpe ratio of 1.08. In 
comparison, the Sharpe ratios are around 0.59—0.95 for currency carry trades, and 0.47—
0.75 for price momentum strategies in the U.S. stock market.6 These results also hold in 
the more recent period when trading costs in the Treasury market are minimal. For 
example, in the period of 1998-2008, the Sharpe ratio of our strategy is 1.44; even after 
accounting for the bid-ask spread, it remains close to 1. Moreover, the documented 
return pattern implies large swings in bond premium around auction days each month. 
Even our most conservative estimate implies that the post-auction annualized bond 
premium is 2.3% higher than its pre-auction counterpart. This difference is economically 
significant given that the unconditional bond premium is only 1.4% in our sample, thus 
posing a big challenge for asset pricing models. 
Finally, the shocks analyzed here are small relative to the size of Treasury 
markets. In the last 10 years, the average auction size of Treasury notes is merely 0.3% 
of the Treasury market size.7 If one takes into account the amount of Treasury securities 
maturing in each month, the net supply shock is even smaller. In addition, the timing 
and size of Treasury auctions are announced in advance, making Treasury auctions a 
clean setting to analyze temporary price effects of supply shocks. Our evidence that 
markets are unable to quickly absorb these anticipated small shocks, repeatedly, 
suggests that capital mobility is perhaps more limited than previously thought, even in 
the most developed financial market.8 It is thus reasonable to expect that similar effects 
play an even bigger role in less liquid markets, such as corporate bond and structured 
product markets. 
                                                            
6 See, e.g., Brunnermeir, Nagel, and Pedersen (2009), Lustig, Roussanov, and Verdelhan (2009), Asness, 
Moskowitz, and Pedersen (2008), and Burnside, Eichenbaum, Kleshchelski, and Rebelo (2010). 
7 In contrast, the demand shocks analyzed in Shleifer (1986) are close to 3% of the shares outstanding.  
8 In a recent study, Fleckenstein, Longstaff, and Lustig (2010) provide another piece of evidence on the 
imperfection of the Treasury markets: Nominal Treasury bonds are significantly underpriced relative to a 
portfolio of TIPS and inflation swaps.  
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The documented return pattern is consistent with two factors working in the 
Treasury market.9 First, primary dealers, who are required to participate actively and to 
submit competitive bids in all Treasury auctions, have limited risk-bearing capacity.10 
They hence hedge part of the risk they are about to acquire in Treasury auctions by 
short selling the same or similar securities in the secondary market before these auctions. 
For example, Fleming and Rosenberg (2007) show that primary dealers take short 
positions in both the secondary Treasury market and when-issued market before 
Treasury auctions.11 Consistent with this interpretation, we find that the price impact in 
the secondary Treasury market is more pronounced precisely when the total risk to be 
acquired by primary dealers is larger; for instance, when the auction size is larger and 
when Treasury returns are more volatile (as implied by options on Treasury securities). 
The limited risk bearing capacity of primary dealers alone, however, is unable to 
explain the whole phenomenon: Primary dealers’ short selling in secondary Treasury 
markets would not have a price impact, were there enough arbitrage capital or end-
investors to supply liquidity. It should not come as a surprise that arbitrage capital is 
likely insufficient to absorb the entire supply due to Treasury auctions, which is in the 
magnitude of tens of billions of dollars. Yet for primary dealers’ shorting to have a 
material price impact, we must also have end-investors’ capital be slow-moving. This 
point is particularly important since a large amount — sometimes even larger than the 
                                                            
9 An alternative interpretation is that Treasury auctions have information contents. Although Treasury 
auctions are fully anticipated, their outcomes are likely to contain information about economic conditions. 
However, if uncertainty about these auctions is resolved gradually in the days leading up to these auctions, 
the pre-auction Treasury returns should be higher than post-auction ones, opposite to our findings. 
10 According to Administration of Relationships with Primary Dealers, available from the website of the 
Federal Reserve Bank of New York, http://www.ny.frb.org/markets/pridealers_policies.html, “Primary 
dealers are also required to participate in all auctions of U.S. government debt and to make reasonable 
markets for the New York Fed when it transacts on behalf of its foreign official account-holders.” 
According to Fleming (2007), primary dealers alone purchased 70.9% of Treasury securities sold to the 
public (and another 21.6% on behalf of their institutional clients) during July 30, 2001 to December 28, 
2005. 
11 Fleming and Rosenberg (2007) also find a price increase in the week subsequent to the auction, and 
interpret the price appreciation as a compensation for dealers’ bearing the risk associated with their 
inventory changes. 
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offering amount — of Treasury securities are maturing around these auctions — i.e., end 
investors do have enough capital to absorb the supply.12 
Major investors in Treasury markets are indeed likely unresponsive to transient 
demand/supply shocks. Although the total size of Treasury securities outstanding is 
around $10 trillion, over 40% of them are nonmarketable and held by Federal 
Government accounts.13 The Federal Reserve holds another 8% to 9%, most of which is 
obtained through noncompetitive bids at auctions. “Private holdings” constitute the rest, 
of which foreign investors and state and local governments account for more than half. 
While there are no publicly available data on these public or private holdings, it seems 
reasonable to expect that many of them do not have the intention, or resources, to 
engage in short-term arbitrage trades. In addition, insurance companies and bond 
mutual funds, which account for around 13% of private holdings, are also likely to be 
unresponsive to the temporary price movements around auctions. For example, we find 
70% of the insurance companies in the U.S. make less than 5 trades a year in Treasury 
markets. Index bond mutual funds, due to concerns of tracking errors, are likely to 
avoid newly issued securities before they are included in the indices they are tracking. 14  
Our interpretation has a number of further predictions. First, it implies that repo 
rates tend to be lower before auctions. To take short positions in the secondary 
Treasury market, primary dealers need to borrow Treasury securities, which is often 
fulfilled through “reverse repo”  transactions. In these transactions, primary dealers 
effectively lend to their counterparties and take Treasury securities as collateral, which 
they then short-sell in secondary markets. Primary dealers’ strong demand for these 
transactions implies that they would be willing to accept lower interest rates on their 
lending, thus leading to lower repo rates before auctions. Since this hedging activity is 
expected to last only for a few days, its impact should be stronger for overnight repo 
                                                            
12 For example, on June 1, 2004, the Treasury Department issued around $25 billion 2-year notes, but 
there were $27 billion worth of Treasury securities maturing on the previous day.  
13 The data on the ownership of Treasury securities are from http://fms.treas.gov/bulletin/index.html. 
14 Many fixed-income indices usually adjust their composition at the end of each month. For example, 
Barclays US Treasury Bond Index adjusts its composition on the last calendar day of each month; see, 
https://ecommerce.barcap.com/indices. 
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rates than for long-term repo rates. Consistent with this conjecture, we find that the 
average overnight general-collateral repo rates during the 5 days before 2-year note 
auctions is 6.75 (t=4.83) basis points lower than that during the 5 days after. The 
pattern for one-week term repo rates is slightly weaker, with a rate differential of 4.39 
(t=4.36) basis points, while that for one-month repo rates is virtually absent. 
Second, since off-the-run notes are close substitutes to on-the-run ones, our 
interpretation implies that the price impact around auctions should also arise for off-
the-run securities. Indeed, we find that the return pattern of off-the-run notes is almost 
identical to that of on-the-run notes. Third, auctions of Treasury securities with one 
maturity should also affect prices of other maturities, and the impact should be stronger 
if the maturity differential is smaller. Consistent with this prediction, we find a similar 
price pattern of 10-year notes around both 2-year and 5-year note auctions, even when 
there is no 10-year note auction in surrounding days. Moreover, relative to 2-year note 
auctions, 5-year note auctions have a much stronger price impact on 10-year notes. 
Finally, since Treasury yields affect the discount and borrowing rates in other 
financial markets, one might expect the Treasury yield movements documented in this 
paper to also affect prices in other markets, such as the equity market. To our surprise, 
we find very large equity price movements around Treasury auctions: The average 
cumulative return of the value-weighted CRSP index in the 5 days before 2-year note 
auctions is 49 (t=3.11) basis points lower than that after these auctions. Put differently, 
in the past three decades, the average stock market return is negative during the 5 days 
before 2-year note auctions, and is more than twice the unconditional average during 
the 5 days after. We further show that this return pattern is not driven by calendar-
time effects (e.g., the turn-of-the week, turn-of-the-month, and turn-of-the-year effects). 
While the stock return pattern is broadly consistent with our interpretation, the exact 
underlying mechanism for such a large price impact remains unclear.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section II reviews the related 
literature and Section III describes the data. Section IV analyzes the impacts of 
Treasury auctions on the secondary Treasury market. Section V presents the 
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interpretation and further analysis implied by the interpretation. Sections VI and VII 
analyze the impact on the repo and stock markets, respectively. Section VIII concludes.  
 
II. Related Literature 
Our paper is closely related to the growing literature on the temporary price impact of 
supply/demand shocks in financial markets. Since the seminal paper by Shleifer (1986), 
there has been a proliferation of research examining the effect of uninformed demand 
shocks on stock returns. For example, Kaul, Mehrotra, and Morck (2000), Wurgler and 
Zhuravskaya (2002), Mitchell, Pulvino, and Stafford (2004), Greenwood (2005), Coval 
and Stafford (2007), Frazzini and Lamont (2008), and Lou (2010) analyze the 
temporary price effects of index additions/deletions, short-selling induced by mergers 
and acquisitions, and mutual fund flow-induced trading in the stock market. The 
contribution of our paper lies in that we provide evidence for temporary price pressure 
in a cleaner setting where the small supply shocks that we analyze are both well 
anticipated and frequently repeated. This unique feature helps highlight the first-order 
importance of market frictions to our understanding of asset price formation and 
evolution. 
 Our results also complement prior research on the supply effect in the Treasury 
market. One strand of this research examines the level effect. For example, Simon (1991, 
1994), Duffee (1996), Fleming (2002), Krishnamurthy (2002), Kuttner (2006), 
Greenwood and Vayanos (2010a), and Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen (2010) 
document a positive correlation between the (residual) supply of individual Treasury 
securities and their idiosyncratic yields. Another strand of research in this literature 
analyzes the supply effect by looking at changes in Treasury yields around various 
policy announcements. For example, Garbade and Rutherford (2007), Gagnon, Raskin, 
Remache and Sack (2010), Greenwood and Vayanos (2010b), D’Amico and King (2011), 
Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen (2011), and Swanson (2011) report significant 
drops in Treasury yields on announcements of large buy-back programs initiated by the 
Treasury and Federal Reserve. Our paper differs from these prior studies in that it 
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examines Treasury auctions’ temporary price impact in the secondary Treasury markets, 
both before and after auctions taking place, as well as their spillover effects across 
maturities and across markets.15 
Our results are generally consistent with the market segmentation view modeled 
in Vayanos and Vila (2009). Preferred-habitat investors cause market segmentation and 
make local demand and supply, in our particular case, the short-selling by primary 
dealers, matter for idiosyncratic Treasury yields. Arbitrageurs, in the meanwhile, take 
away part of the profits and maintain a smooth yield curve, but are constrained by their 
risk/capital capacity. End investors (e.g., federal agencies, sovereign wealth funds, 
pension funds, and etc.), who have sufficient capital to absorb the supply, are slow in 
responding to these shocks. As a result, part of the price effect remains in the data. 
Finally, our results highlight the key role of not only primary dealers’ and 
arbitrageurs’ limited risk-bearing capacity, but more importantly, end-investors’ slow-
moving capital. Hence, our study contributes to the recent theoretical literature that 
starts to incorporate limitations in capital mobility to asset pricing models (e.g., 
Acharya, Shin, and Yorulmazer (2009), He and Xiong (2009), Duffie (2010), Malliaris 
and Yan (2010)).  
 
III. Data 
A. Institutional background of Treasury auctions 
In our sample period of 1980-2008, the U.S. Treasury Department auctioned, on average, 
$2.35 trillion worth of securities each year; the total amount auctioned was $6.7 trillion 
in 2008. The participants of these auctions include primary dealers, institutional 
investors, foreign central banks, the Federal Reserve, and a small number of individual 
investors. The Treasury Department usually schedules the auction dates several months 
                                                            
15 D’Amico and King (2011) also analyze Treasury yield changes on the days when purchase operations by 
the Federal Reserve actually occur, and document a temporary price increase that is largely reversed on 
the following day. However, they focus on a specific, short, period of time, from March to October 2009, 
when the quantitative easing program (QE1) took place. 
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in advance and announces the auction size several days before each auction. 
Immediately after the announcement, dealers and investors in the Treasury market start 
to trade forward contracts on the soon-to-be-issued Treasury security in the “when-
issued” market.  
In each auction, primary dealers and other competitive bidders submit sealed 
bids of rate-quantity pairs that specify the amount to be purchased at each minimum 
yield. Two auction mechanisms have been employed in Treasury auctions: multiple-price 
and single-price auctions. Under both mechanisms, the clearing price is identified by 
equating the aggregate demand submitted by competitive bidders to the total issue 
amount minus the total demand from noncompetitive bidders (i.e., those who submit 
market orders). The difference between the two mechanisms lies in that, while in 
multiple-price auctions, competitive bidders pay for their allocated shares at their 
submitted rates, in single-price auctions, all winning bidders pay the same price. While 
almost all Treasury auctions in the 1980s were multiple-price auctions, the single-price 
mechanism is the dominant form in the more recent two decades.16  
B. Data sample 
From the U.S. Treasury Department website, we collect detailed information regarding 
individual auctions for Treasury notes, with maturities ranging from 2 to 10 years. Such 
information includes the auction date, issue date, auction mechanism, bids submitted, 
total tender amount received, total tender amount accepted, lowest and highest winning 
rates, etc. Our sample spans from January 1980 to June 2008, during which period 2-
year Treasury notes are issued on a monthly basis and 10-year notes are issued on a 
quarterly basis. The issuing frequency of 5-year notes varied a few times in this period. 
In total, we have 332 2-year note auctions, 210 5-year note auctions, and 132 10-year 
note auctions.17 We then match our auction data with the CRSP daily U.S. Treasury 
database to obtain daily Treasury security prices and carried interests. Throughout our 
                                                            
16 For more detailed discussions of these two auction mechanisms see, e.g., Goldreich (2007). 
17 The Treasury also issued 3-, 4-, and 7-year notes roughly at a quarterly frequency. Their issuance, 
however, was interrupted in the period of 1998-2003 for 3-year notes, 1990-2008 for 4-year notes, and 
1993-2008 for 7-year notes.  
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analysis, we use the average of the bid and ask prices from CRSP as our measure of 
clean prices.  
 We supplement our Treasury auction and yield data with five additional data 
sources. First, we obtain daily repo rates from Bloomberg. Second, to examine insurance 
companies’ trading activities in Treasury markets, we get their trading records from 
their annual reports to National Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC). In 
particular, Schedule D of these reports includes trades by insurance companies in each 
year and their holdings at the end of the year.18 Third, we obtain daily stock returns 
from the CRSP daily stock files. Fourth, we collect from TrimTabs, for the period of 
1998-2008, daily investment flows to three major mutual fund classes: bond mutual 
funds, equity funds, and hybrid funds. Finally, from Mueller, Vedolin, and Yen (2011), 
we obtain the daily model-free estimates of maturity-weighted implied volatility of 
nearest-to-expiry at-the-money options on the 30-year, 10-year, and 5-year Treasury 
securities. 
Table I presents some descriptive statistics of our sample. Panel A reports the 
summary statistics associated with Treasury auctions, and Panels B and C report those 
for all other main variables. The average size of Treasury auctions across all maturities 
is well over $10 billion. The average daily Treasury note return ranges from 1.96 (for 2-
year notes) to 2.31 (for 10-year notes) basis points. The average daily return of the 
value- and equal-weighted CRSP indices and the value-weighted S&P 500 index are 4.45, 
8.15, and 3.53 basis points, respectively. The average daily flows to bond, equity, and 
hybrid mutual funds reported by TrimTabs are 0.4, -0.92, and -0.19 basis points per 
day. 19  Finally, the average maturity-weighted Treasury-auction implied volatility is 
around 8% in our sample. 
 
                                                            
18 See Jiang, Yan, and Yu (2010) for detailed descriptions of this dataset. 
19 See Edelen and Warner (2001) and Greene and Hodges (2002) for a description of the construction of 
flows and its potential issues. 
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IV. Price Impact on Secondary Markets 
To analyze the impact of Treasury auctions on the secondary Treasury market, we first 
examine yields-to-maturity of 2-year notes, the most frequently issued Treasury notes, 
around subsequent 2-year note auctions. Specifically, for each 2-year note auction, we 
calculate daily yields to maturity of the on-the-run 2-year note during both the 10 days 
before and 10 days after the auction and compare them with the yield on the auction 
day.20 Since there is a 2-year note auction almost every month in our sample, these 20-
day event windows around auctions cover virtually all trading days in our sample period. 
The pattern in Treasury yields around auctions can be easily seen in Figure 1. 
The upper-left panel plots the time series average of Y(t)-Y(0), where Y(t) is the yield 
of the on-the-run 2-year note on day t and Y(0) is the yield of the same security on the 
auction day. There is a clear inverted-V shaped pattern: yields tend to go up before 
auctions and then decrease afterward. More detailed results are presented in Table II: 
The yield differences, Y(t)-Y(0), are negative in the entire 20-day event window 
surrounding each auction, and are statistically significant in the 4 days immediately 
before the auctions and 6 days after the auctions. More specifically, the yield of 2-year 
notes increases, on average, by 2.53 basis points during the 5-day period before the 
auctions, but decreases by 2.32 basis points during the 5-day period afterward. 
These results suggest that 2-year note auctions exert temporary price pressure on 
the existing 2-year notes; secondary market prices are lower on auction days than in 
surrounding days. Another way to see this price impact is to compare 2-year note 
returns before and after these auctions. This approach effectively integrates the pre- and 
post-auction impacts into one measure and so increases the statistical power in detecting 
such price impact. As shown in Table III, the return of the on-the-run 2-year note on 
the day prior to the subsequent auction is, on average, 3.68 basis points lower than the 
return of the same note on the day immediately after the auction, with a t-statistic of 
3.90. The return difference is positive and statistically significant in the entire 20-day 
window: The average cumulative return during the 10 days after auctions is 9.20 basis 
                                                            
20 We track the same 2-year note throughout the 20-day window around each auction, even though this 
security becomes off-the-run immediately after the auction. 
12 
 
points higher than that during the 10 days before, with a t-statistic of 2.02. The return 
differential achieves its maximum on day 6, with a point estimate of 10.2 basis points 
and a t-statistic of 3.62. 
The documented yield and return pattern around subsequent auctions is not 
unique to 2-year notes. A very similar pattern exists for other maturities. For example, 
as shown in Table II, the yield of the on-the-run 5-/10-year notes increases by 2.67/1.57 
basis points during the 5 days before auctions, and decreases by 2.73/2.00 basis points 
in the 5 days after. Moreover, as shown in Table III, the cumulative 5-day return of the 
on-the-run 5-year Treasury note before a 5-year note auction is, on average, 22.54 
(t=3.67) basis points lower than the 5-day return of the same note after the auction. 
This return difference is 23.84 (t=1.78) basis points for 10-year notes.   
A. Economic significance 
The temporary movements in Treasury yields around subsequent auctions have a 
number of important implications. First, they represent a substantial issuance cost 
borne by the Treasury Department, which has been largely ignored in prior literature. 
Second, they imply a potentially large trading profit, even after taking into account 
transaction costs. Finally, these large swings in average Treasury returns provide useful 
guidance for future asset-pricing models. We examine these issues in more detail in this 
section. 
A.1. Large issuance costs  
In prior literature, Treasury auction markups are usually measured as the difference 
between the auction price and some benchmark traded price on auction days (e.g., the 
secondary market price or the forward price in the when-issue market). While this is 
perhaps a clean measure of auction underpricing due to winner’s curse, it does not 
reflect the total cost borne by the Treasury Department, as our previous results suggest 
that the secondary market prices on auction days have already been driven down by 
these auctions.  
To take into account the price pressure effect resulting from Treasury auctions, 
we take as the benchmark price the average secondary Treasury market prices around 
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each auction (rather than on the auction day). We then calculate the amount of money 
the Treasury Department could have saved were it able to issue Treasury notes at this 
benchmark price. We note that this is likely a conservative estimate since the auctioned 
security will become “on-the-run” in several days and should be worth more than the 
soon-to-be-off-the-run security in the secondary market, as suggested by the well-known 
on-the-run-off-the-run phenomenon (e.g., Amihud and Mendelson (1991), 
Krishnamurthy (2002)). Table IV shows that Treasury issues notes at yields that are 
significantly higher than those in the secondary market. Panel A reports ܻሺܣሻ െ തܻሺݐሻ, 
where ܻሺܣሻ is the auction yield and തܻሺݐሻ is the average of the on-the-run note yields on 
the tth day before and tth day after the auction, with t ranging from 1 to 10. The results 
suggest that auction yields are significantly higher than yields in the secondary market 
around auctions. Take 2-year notes, for example: the yield difference measure, ܻሺܣሻ െ
തܻሺݐሻ,  for t=1, 5, and 10 are 3.63 (t=5.77), 4.90 (t=4.62), and 5.05 (t=3.42) basis points, 
respectively. The results are similar for 5- and 10-year notes. For t equal to 5, the yield 
difference is 4.04 (t=4.70) basis points for 5-year notes and 2.66 (t=3.12) basis points 
for 10-year notes.  
Based on these yield differences, we further compute the implied cost borne by 
the Treasury Department both as a fraction of total issuance size and in dollar terms. 
As shown in Panel B, based on the yield difference for t=5, the issuance costs for 2-, 5-, 
and 10- year notes are 9.07, 16.81, and 18.43 basis points of the auction size, 
respectively. These figures translate into large dollar amounts. For 2007, the last full 
year in our sample, the implied total cost of issuing Treasury notes amounts to $649 
million. Based on the yield difference ܻሺܣሻ െ തܻሺݐሻ,  for t ≥ 8, the implied costs are well 
above $700 million. 
While it is by no means clear how part of the above estimated issuance cost can 
be saved through better designs of the Treasury issuance mechanism, recognizing this 
cost is undoubtedly an essential first step to assess and improve the efficiency of the 
mechanism. Motivated by our empirical results, Jin and Yan (2011) analyze a model of 
security issuance when issuance has a price impact in the secondary market. In 
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particular, they analyze the potential benefits and costs when the seller increases the 
frequency of auctions and hence reduce the lumpiness of the supply shocks.     
A.2. Trading profits  
The documented return pattern around Treasury auctions also implies potentially large 
trading profits. For example, to take advantage of the price movements around 2-year 
note auctions that happen almost every month in our sample, one can short the on-the-
run 2-year note in the t days before each auction, and long a duration-matched portfolio 
comprising the on-the-run 6-month T-bill and 10-year note to hedge out the interest 
rate risk. Then one can switch to the reversed positions, long the 2-year note and short 
the 6-month bill and 10-year note, in the t days after the auction. As shown in Table V, 
this simple long-short portfolio generates significant profits. Panel A reports the results 
based on the full sample. The portfolio return is significant and positive for all t ranging 
from 1 to 10, with 9 out of the 10 return estimates being significant at the 1% level. For 
t=10, for instance, the average return of this trading strategy is 8.62 (t=3.65) basis 
points, with an annualized Sharpe ratio of 1.08. For reference, the Sharpe ratios for 
currency carry trades and stock price momentum are around 0.59-0.95 and 0.47-0.75, 
respectively (see, e.g., Brunnermeir, Nagel, and Pedersen (2009), Lustig, Roussanov, and 
Verdelhan (2009) and Asness, Moskowitz, and Pedersen (2008)). 
The strategy requires large turnover: one needs to complete two “round trips” 
each month for both their long and short positions, and hence to pay twice the bid-ask 
spreads. To examine whether transaction costs have a material impact on the 
documented trading profits, we start by exploiting time-series variations in bid-ask 
spreads in our sample period. We estimate from the CRSP dataset that the average bid-
ask spread for 2-year on-the-run notes drops from 9 basis points in the first 10 years of 
our sample to 1.7 basis points in the last 10 years, a general trend consistent with prior 
evidence based on various data sources (e.g., Amihud and Mendelson (1991), Jegadeesh 
(1993), Fleming (2003)). If trading costs play a significant role in explaining our return 
pattern, we would expect to observe a decreasing trend in the profitability of this 
strategy. However, as shown in Panel B of Table V, the average returns to our simple 
strategy in the last 10 years of the sample are similar in economic magnitude to those 
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based on the full sample, and with a much higher Sharpe ratio. Take t=10, for example: 
the annualized Sharpe ratio of the strategy in the last 10 years is 1.44, compared with 
1.08 achieved in the full sample. 
To more directly assess the Sharpe ratio net of transaction costs, we take bid-ask 
spread estimates from Fleming (2003), who calculates daily interdealer bid-ask spreads 
for on-the-run Treasury securities using firm/market quotes from GovPX for the period 
of December 1996 to March 2000. 21 Based on these estimates, the overall bid-ask spread 
for our long-short portfolio is 1.46 basis points.22 Since our trading strategy requires two 
round trips each month, the total transaction cost is 35.04 (=1.46×2×12) basis points per 
year. In other words, after taking into account transaction costs, the Sharpe ratio of the 
strategy is still as high as 0.95 during the last 10 years of our sample. 
A.3.  Implications for theoretical models 
The large Sharpe ratio of our trading strategy calls for a search for additional risk 
factors that the strategy may be exposed to and, perhaps more likely, the trading 
frictions beyond bid-ask spreads (e.g., the cost of shorting Treasury securities) that may 
prevent arbitrageurs from exploiting this opportunity.  
Moreover, the large swings in Treasury returns between the pre- and post-auction 
periods pose a significant challenge to asset-pricing models. Our most conservative 
estimate, based on the entire 20-day window around each auction, implies an increase in 
annualized expected 2-year note return by 2.3% from the pre-auction to post-auction 
period. For reference, the average 2-year note return premium (over 3-month T-bill 
returns) is 1.4% in our sample. This result is hard to explain by existing asset-pricing 
theories, especially given the recurring nature of this phenomenon. 
                                                            
21 It has been noticed that the CRSP indicative bid-ask spread data has various problems, especially for 
the early sample period (see, e.g., Duffee (1996)). 
22 Fleming (2003) shows that the average bid-ask spreads for 10-year, 2-year, and 6-month Treasury 
securities are 2.44, 0.66, and 0.37 basis points, respectively. According to our duration estimates, the 
hedge portfolio has 20% in 10-year notes and 80% in 6-month T-bills. Thus the bid-ask spread for the 
whole portfolio is 0.66+2.44×0.2+0.37×0.8=1.46 basis points. 
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B. Robustness 
The phenomenon documented here is not unique to on-the-run securities. As shown in 
the lower row of Figure 1, the yield pattern for off-the-run notes is almost the same as 
that for the on-the-run securities. We repeated the analysis in Tables II and III for off-
the-run notes and get very similar results. We also conduct a number of additional tests 
to examine the robustness of our results. First, we repeat our analysis on three 
subsamples: 1980-1990, 1991-2000, and 2001-2008. The main results hold for all 
subsamples and appear to be stronger for the more recent two decades. Second, since 
auctions usually take place in the middle of a day, it is unclear whether the return on 
the auction day itself should be classified as pre-auction or post-auction. We repeat our 
analysis by excluding auction day returns and the results are by and large unchanged. 
Finally, since Treasury securities accumulate interest payments on each calendar day 
(rather than trading day), we accordingly adjust for the effect of weekends and holidays 
on our return patterns. The results, omitted for brevity, are virtually identical to those 
reported in Tables II and III.  
 
V. Interpretations  
It seems natural to try to link this phenomenon to the information contents in auctions. 
Although the date and amount of auctions can be almost perfectly anticipated, auction 
outcomes, such as the bid-to-cover ratio and coupon rate, are likely to be informative 
signals about the Treasury markets and the overall economic conditions. If the 
uncertainty about auctions is resolved gradually during the days leading to these 
auctions, we should expect that the average Treasury returns before auctions be higher 
than those after. This prediction, however, is opposite to what we find in the data. 
A more plausible interpretation is that Treasury auctions exert significant 
temporary price impacts in secondary Treasury markets. A telltale sign of this 
interpretation is that there is a strong return reversal in Treasury returns around 
auctions. For the portfolio examined in Table V, for example, the correlation between 
the 10-day pre-auction return and the 10-day post-auction return is 0.22, with a p-value 
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of 0.002. This implies return reversal in 2-year notes since the strategy is short in the 2-
year note before auctions, but is long in the 2-year note after auctions.   
More precisely, our interpretation has two ingredients. First, primary dealers 
have limited risk-bearing capacity. In the U.S. Treasury market, primary dealers are 
expected to participate actively in all auctions and submit meaningful bids. Put 
differently, primary dealers are expected to acquire large positions in these auctioned 
securities. Due to limited risk-bearing capacity, the dealers need to hedge this to-be-
acquired large exposure by shorting similar securities in the secondary Treasury market 
as well as shorting in the when-issued market. These short-selling activities exert 
significant downward pressure on secondary market prices.23  
The second ingredient of our interpretation is that end-investors in Treasury 
markets are likely constrained from providing liquidity instantly. This point is 
particularly important since a large amount — relative to auction size — of Treasury 
securities are also maturing around auctions, indicating that end-investors indeed have 
enough capital to absorb the supply shock from these auctions. For primary dealers’ 
shorting activities to have any significant price impact, end-investors’ capital has to be 
slow moving. Our interpretation has a number of further implications, which we explore 
next. 
A. Limited risk-bearing capacity  
Primary dealers’ limited risk-bearing capacity has the following two additional 
predictions. First, given the similarities among Treasury notes across maturities, the 
price pressure resulting from Treasury auctions of one maturity should naturally spill 
over to Treasury securities with different maturities, and this impact should be stronger 
if the maturity differential is smaller. Second, the price impact of Treasury auctions 
should be stronger when the total risk expected to be acquired by primary dealers is 
higher; for instance, when the auction size is larger and in periods with higher implied 
Treasury return volatilities. 
                                                            
23 Primary dealers’ short selling in the when-issued market can also depress spot Treasury prices, if the 
counterparties with long positions in the when-issued market hedge their exposure in the secondary 
Treasury market.  
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To test the first prediction, we examine the yield patterns of 10-year notes 
around 2- and 5-year note auctions. We explicitly exclude observations where there is a 
10-year note auction within 10 days of a 2- or 5-year note auction, to ensure that we are 
not picking up the effect of own auctions.24 Consistent with our prediction, Table VI 
shows that an inverted V-shaped yield pattern also arises for 10-year notes around 2- or 
5-year note auctions. 10-year note yields increase significantly before both 2- and 5-year 
note auctions and decrease afterward. Not surprisingly, because of the large difference in 
maturity between 2-year and 10-year notes, the yield change resulting from 2-year note 
auctions is small, hovering around one basis point, and is statistically significant in only 
a few days surrounding auction days. In contrast, 5-year note auctions have a much 
stronger impact on 10-year yields. The magnitude of the impact is around 3 basis points, 
and 6 out of the 10 point estimates are significant at the 5% level. 
In testing the second prediction, we conduct a simple time-series regression. The 
dependent variable is the cumulative return of the long-short portfolio defined in Table 
V during the 20-day window around auctions, which is meant to measure the price 
impact of Treasury auctions. The independent variables include the offering size and 
Treasury options implied return volatilities, both of which reflect the risk primary 
dealers are expected to acquire at auctions. We use Mueller, Vedolin, and Yen (2011)’s 
model-free estimates of maturity-weighted average implied volatilities of nearest-to-
expiry at-the-money options on the 30-year, 10-year, and 5-year Treasury securities at 
the end of the previous month. The results are similar if we use different weights (e.g., 
equal weights). We also include year fixed effects to de-trend offering size. The results 
are summarized in Table VII. Consistent with the prediction, we find that the price 
impact of Treasury auctions is substantially more pronounced when the offering size is 
larger and when the Treasury market is more volatile. Specifically, as shown in Panel A, 
the coefficient estimate on offering size is 4.58 (t=1.71) and that on the implied 
volatility is 1.68 (t=2.28). In other words, one-standard-deviation increases in offering 
                                                            
24 This requirement significantly limits our potential choices of combinations. For example, we cannot 
examine the yield patterns of 2-year notes around auctions of 5- and 10-year note auctions, as there are 
only a small number of 5- and 10-year note auctions that are not within one week of any 2-year note 
auction. 
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size and Treasury options implied volatility lead to 1.79 (=4.58×0.39) and 2.94 
(=1.68×1.75) basis points increases in the long-short portfolio return.  
The marginal significance of offering size is likely due to the fact that auctions of 
other maturities also occur in the vicinity of 2-year note auctions. For instance, in a 
large part of our sample, there is a 5-year note auction within a few days following each 
2-year note auction. Due to the across-maturity spillover effect (Table VI), these 5-year 
note auctions can mitigate (or sometimes strengthen) the price impact of 2-year note 
auctions. To better capture the price effect of Treasury auctions of all maturities, we 
construct a measure of “offering size imbalance,” ܱܵܫሺݐሻ , which is defined as the 
logarithm of the aggregate offering amount from all Treasury note auctions of any 
maturity during the t days prior to the day in question (i.e., day 0) minus that during 
the t days following day 0. The idea is that if more Treasury securities are auctioned in 
the next few days, the price pressure implies a low return today. On the other hand, if 
more securities are auctioned in the previous a few days, the recovery from that price 
pressure implies a high return for today. That is, our price pressure interpretation 
implies a positive coefficient on ܱܵܫሺݐሻ. To address time variations in expected bond 
returns, we use the daily 2-year note return minus the average 2-year return in the 
surrounding 20 days as the dependent variable.25 Consistent with our prediction, as 
shown in Panel B, the coefficients estimates on ܱܵܫሺݐሻ are significantly positive. For 
example, the coefficient is 0.029 (t=2.79) for ܱܵܫሺ5ሻ, and 0.046 (t=3.83) for ܱܵܫሺ10ሻ. 
Put differently, an increase in ܱܵܫሺ5ሻ by the average size of a 2-year note auction (i.e., 
$20 billion) is associated with an increase in daily 2-year note returns of 0.69 
(=0.029×log(20B)) basis points.  
Taken together, the evidence lends further support to our hypothesis that, due to 
limited risk-bearing capacity, primary dealers hedge the risk they are expected to 
acquire at auctions by short selling similar securities, and thus causing downward price 
pressure in secondary markets before auctions. In addition, such price impact is more 
                                                            
25 Alternatively, we also use unadjusted daily returns as the dependent variable with and without month-
fixed effects. The results remain similar. 
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pronounced for Treasury securities with closer maturities to those auctioned securities, 
when the auction amount is larger, and when Treasury markets are more volatile. 
B. Slow-moving end-investors  
The second ingredient in our interpretation is end-investors’ slow responses to transitory 
yield changes in the Treasury market. Major investors in Treasury markets are indeed 
likely to be unresponsive to transient demand/supply shocks. According to data 
compiled by the Treasury Department, although the total size of the Treasury securities 
outstanding is around $10 trillion toward the end of our sample, over 40% of them are 
nonmarketable and held by Federal Government accounts. The Federal Reserve holds 
another 8% to 9% of outstanding Treasury securities, most of which is obtained through 
noncompetitive bids at auctions. Given the mandates of the Federal Reserve, it is 
unlikely that either would respond to transient movements in Treasury yields. “Private 
holdings” account for the rest, of which state and local governments and foreign 
investors hold more than half. While there are no publicly available data on these 
investors’ trading behavior, it seems reasonable to expect that many of them do not 
have the intention, or resources, to adjust their positions on a daily basis to exploit the 
opportunity from transitory price movements.  
In addition, we have two pieces of further evidence on the slow responses of two 
other major investors in Treasury securities. First, insurance companies collectively hold 
about $160 billion of Treasury securities at the end of our sample, which amounts to 3.3% 
of the private holdings. We gather data on their trading and holdings from Schedule D 
of their reports to National Association of Insurance Companies (NAIC). Our analyses 
suggest that insurance companies trade very infrequently in the Treasury market. For 
example, close to 70% of all insurance companies make less than five trades, and in any 
given year, around 14% of them do not make any trade. While this finding is consistent 
with insurance companies’ general objective to maintain a low turnover, it suggests that 
insurance companies are unlikely to absorb sudden supply changes in the Treasury 
market.  
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Second, we also examine the behavior of bond mutual funds. At the end of our 
sample, bond mutual funds collectively hold close to 500 billion dollars’ worth of 
Treasury securities, which accounts for around 10% of all private holdings. Index bond 
mutual funds are likely to avoid newly issued securities due to concerns of tracking 
errors. Many fixed-income indices usually adjust their composition at the end of each 
month. As a result, index bond mutual fund managers are likely to be reluctant to 
purchase the new securities before they are included in the indices they are tracking. In 
other words, rather than exploiting the yield changes around auctions, index fund might 
be part of the cause of the phenomenon.  
For active bond mutual funds, while we do not directly observe their trading, we 
gauge their ability to absorb sudden increases in Treasury supply by examining their 
capital flow patterns around Treasury auctions. Specifically, we obtain a daily series of 
total net assets and investment returns for three fund classes — bond funds, equity funds, 
and hybrid funds (which invest in both bonds and equities), from TrimTabs. We then 
compute the daily investment flow to each fund class in day t as the percentage change 
in total net assets from t-1 to t, after adjusting for the investment return in day t. 
Similar to the tests for bond return patterns around auctions, we compare the difference 
between the cumulative capital flow to each fund class during the t days subsequent to 
an auction and the cumulative flow during the t days prior to the auction. We focus on 
2-year Treasury note auctions in this test since the flow data are not available before 
1998 and there are too few observations for other maturities in the post-1998 period.  
The results are shown in Table VIII. Columns 1 and 2 present the flow pattern 
for bond mutual funds around 2-year note auctions. Overall, there are significantly 
larger capital inflows to bond mutual funds after Treasury auctions than before these 
auctions. The difference in cumulative capital flows to bond funds keeps drifting upward 
after the auction day and peaks on days 9 and 10. During the 10 days after a 2-year 
note auction, the cumulative capital inflow to bond mutual funds is about 16 (t=3.02) 
basis points higher than that during the 10 days prior to the auction. For reference, the 
average daily flow to bond mutual funds in our sample period is only 0.4 basis points 
each day. The evidence that investors move their capital into bond mutual funds at a 
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higher rate after Treasury auctions than before these auctions suggests that mutual fund 
investors  are slow in reallocating their capital across asset classes, perhaps due to 
limited attention.26 Consistent with this view, in further analyses, we find that capital 
flows to equity and hybrid mutual funds after auctions are generally lower than those 
before auctions, albeit with marginal statistical significance.  
 
VI. The Impact on Repo Markets 
Our interpretation also implies that auctions may exert a large impact on the repo 
markets. Recall that, anticipating the large positions that they will assume at auctions, 
primary dealers would short in the secondary market to hedge the risk. To take short 
positions, they need to borrow Treasury securities through “reverse repo” transactions, 
which is essentially primary dealers lending cash to their counterparties and taking 
Treasury securities as collateral, so they can sell those Treasury securities short. From 
the perspective of their counterparties, these are repo transactions. Naturally, primary 
dealers have stronger incentives to initiate these reverse-repo transactions shortly before 
Treasury auctions than in other periods. As a result, they would be willing to accept 
lower interest rates in these transactions, leading to lower repo rates before auctions. 
Moreover, since this hedging activity is expected to last only for a few days, the impact 
should be stronger for overnight repo rates than for long-term repo rates.  
To test this idea, we obtain daily data on overnight, one-week, and one-month 
repo rates from Bloomberg. Since our prediction is that repo rates decrease before 
auctions due to the scarcity of Treasury security collaterals, our analysis is focused on 
general-collateral repo rates, which are the interest rates in repo contracts backed by 
Government General Collaterals. Since the repo data are available only for the post-
1992 period, we center our analysis around the most frequent 2-year note auctions for 
statistical power reasons.  
                                                            
26 The evidence does not pin down how investors are attracted to bond mutual funds after auctions. It 
could be that investors have more exposure to media coverage about Treasury securities around auctions, 
which induces them to invest. Alternatively, some institutional investors may prefer to keep a low 
turnover and adjust their positions infrequently. The higher yields around auctions can only attract these 
institutional investors slowly over time.  
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We compare the average repo rates after 2-year note auctions with those before. 
The results are reported in Table IX. Consistent with our prediction, repo rates in the 
pre-auction period are significantly lower than those in the post-auction period. For 
example, as shown in columns 1 and 2, the average overnight repo rate during the 10 
days before auctions is, on average, 3.47 basis points lower than during the 10-day 
period after the auctions, with a t-statistic of 2.21. This rate differential is positive for 
the entire 20-day window around auction days and reaches its maximum on day 5, with 
a point estimate of 6.75 basis points and a t-statistic of 4.83. There is a similar but 
slightly weaker pattern in one-week term repo rates (columns 3 and 4). For example, 
the average 5-day pre-auction one-week rate is 4.39 (t=4.36) basis points lower than 
that during the post-auction 5-day period. This pattern almost completely disappears 
for one-month term repo rates, for which most of the point estimates are 
indistinguishable from 0. These results are consistent with the hypothesis that primary 
dealers hedge their risk in the a few days before Treasury auctions, and thus drive down 
short-term repo rates. We also repeat our analysis on reverse repo rates. Since the 
relationship between repo and reverse repo rates are similar to that between bid and ask 
prices, the results based on reverse repo rates, omitted for brevity, are almost identical 
to those based on repo rates.  
 
VII. The Impact on Stock Returns 
More broadly, since Treasury yields are the basis for pricing assets in other financial 
markets, and given the magnitude of fluctuations in Treasury yields around auctions, 
one may expect these Treasury auctions to also significantly affect the prices in other 
markets, such as the U.S. equity market. We examine three market indices: the value-
weighted CRSP index, the equal-weighted CRSP index, and the value-weighted S&P 
500 index. For each index, we compute ∆ܥܴሺݐሻ, the cumulative market return during 
the t days after each auction minus that during the t days before the auction. The 
results are reported in Table X. Columns 1 and 2 present the average of ∆ܥܴሺݐሻ based 
on the value-weighted CRSP index around 2-year Treasury note auctions. ∆ܥܴሺݐሻ is 
significantly positive for all t ranging from 4 to 9, and peaks on day 6. For example, 
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∆ܥܴሺ5ሻ is 49 (t=3.11) basis points; that is, the cumulative CRSP value-weighted market 
return in the 5 days after a 2-year Treasury note auction is, on average, 49 basis points 
higher than that during the 5 days before these auctions. This is a substantial difference 
since the unconditional expected return of the value-weighted CRSP index is 4.45 basis 
points per day. In other words, the annualized expected return in the 5 days before each 
auction is -1.1%, while that based on the 5 days after an auction is 23.4%. This return 
pattern is similar for equal-weighted CRSP returns, as reported in columns 3 and 4. 
Interestingly, this return pattern also arises for the value-weighted S&P 500 index 
(columns 5 and 6), suggesting the observed phenomenon is not driven by small stocks 
only.  
The stock return effect documented here is not specific to 2-year note auctions. 
In unreported analysis, we find a similar stock return pattern around 5-year note 
auctions. but due to substantial reduction in sample size, the estimate based on 10-year 
auctions is statistically insignificant. To analyze the price impact resulting from 
Treasury auctions of all maturities simultaneously, we conduct a similar analysis to that 
reported in Panel B of Table VII. Specifically, we regress excess daily stock market 
returns on offering size imbalance. Our results, omitted for brevity, show that stock 
returns tend to be higher (lower) if more Treasury notes are auctioned in the previous 
(subsequent) 5 to 10 days. 
We also consider a number of alternative explanations for the stock return 
pattern. First, one might suspect that the higher post-auction returns are compensation 
for higher volatility. However, we find that stock market returns, based on all three 
market indices, are slightly more volatile before Treasury auctions than after, thus 
inconsistent with this hypothesis. In addition, our findings cannot be attributed to 
previously known calendar-time return effects such as turn-of-the-month and turn-of-
the-year effects. We exclude all Treasury auctions from our analyses that take place 
between the 25th of a month to the 5th of the following month, or in the first or last 
month of a year, and the results are very similar.  
One possible interpretation of our finding is that the temporary drop in Treasury 
prices before auctions induces some investors, such as asset allocation mutual funds and 
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hedge funds, to move their capital from the equity market to the Treasury market. Such 
cross-market arbitrage trades can then lead to a temporary price effect in the equity 
market. While direct tests of this mechanism, which require detailed daily trading data 
of hedge funds and mutual funds in both markets, are not feasible, we provide some 
circumstantial evidence consistent with this hypothesis. In unreported analysis, we find 
that the stock return pattern is substantially stronger among stocks with higher 
idiosyncratic volatilities, higher effective bid-ask spreads, and higher institutional 
ownership. While this interpretation is potentially consistent with our findings, the 
exact underlying mechanism for such a large price impact remains unclear. 
 
VIII. Conclusion 
Our empirical evidence suggests that anticipated and frequently repeated supply shocks 
such as Treasury auctions can have first-order impacts on the secondary Treasury, repo, 
and equity markets. These results suggest significant issuance costs borne by the 
Treasury Department, which are an order of magnitude larger than the estimated 
auction markups in prior literature. For instance, the estimated cost of issuing Treasury 
notes alone is over half a billion dollars in 2007. Our results further call for theoretical 
and empirical studies to analyze and improve the efficiency of the Treasury security-
selling mechanism in settings in which anticipated supply shocks can affect market 
prices. 
Our results also pose significant challenges to existing asset-pricing theories and 
suggest that market frictions are playing an important role even in the most liquid and 
well-developed financial markets. Hence, explicitly modeling the risk-bearing capacity of 
broker-dealers in financial markets and the slow responses of some classes of large 
investors might be fruitful directions for future research. 
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Table I. Summary Statistics 
 
Panel A reports the summary statistics of Treasury note auctions. Maturity is the 
number of years to maturity of a Treasury note. Under Auction Type, “Multiple” 
denotes a multiple-price auction and “Single” denotes a single-price auction. No. of 
Issues is the total number of issues in our sample. Amount is the face value issued at 
each auction. Bid-to-Cover Ratio is the ratio of total value bid in an auction to the total 
face value issued to all competitive bidders. Auction Yield is the maximum winning 
yield for a single-price auction, and is the weighted-average yield based on the amount 
issued at each winning yield for a multiple-price auction. Panel B reports the summary 
statistics for Treasury notes and stocks. daily return is the change in daily price levels 
including coupon distributions. duration is the modified duration (expressed in years) of 
the on-the-run security on the subsequent auction day. vwght daily return is the value-
weighted portfolio return, and ewght daily return is the equal-weighted portfolio return. 
The sample period for Panels A and B is January 1980 to June 2008. Panel C reports 
the summary statistics for other data. Treasury options implied volatility is the model-
free maturity-weighted implied volatility of nearest-to-expiry at-the-money options on 
the 30-year, 10-year, and 5-year Treasury securities from January 1982 to June 2008. 
daily flow is the daily percentage flow to mutual funds from January 1998 to June 2008. 
The sample period for repo rates is from January 1992 to June 2008. Yields, returns, 
and daily flows are expressed in basis points. 
 
Panel A: Summary statistics of Treasury auctions (1980-2008) 
Maturity Auction  No. of  Amount ($ Billions) Bid-to-Cover Ratio Auction Yield (%)
 Type Issues Mean Stdev Mean Stdev Mean Stdev  
2 Multiple 150 10.13 3.24 2.68 0.56 9.26 2.59 
2 Single  182 22.93 6.21 2.61 0.4 5.09 1.28 
2 Total 332 17.13  8.16  2.64 0.48  6.36 2.62 
5 Multiple 64 7.66 2.41 2.78 0.49 8.78 2.61 
5 Single  146 14.83 2.84 2.57 0.38 4.68 0.66 
5 Total 210 12.64 4.27 2.63 0.43 7.01 2.86 
10 Multiple 75 9.92 3.65 2.44 0.34 7.76 3.19 
10 Single  57 13.03 4.01 2.38 0.43 5.29 0.64 
10 Total 132 11.27 4.1 2.41 0.38 7.57 3.14 
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Panel B: Summary statistics of Treasury notes and stocks (1980-2008) 
Variables Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
25th Median 75th 
Summary statistics of Treasury note returns (basis point) 
daily return (2-year) 2.85 16.24 -4.24 2.34 9.63 
daily return (5-year) 3.33 34.48 -13.65 3.08 20.58 
daily return (10-year) 3.36 49.75 -23.16 3.33 30.45 
Summary statistics of Treasury note durations (year) 
duration (2-year) 1.78 0.07 1.74 1.79 1.83 
duration (5-year) 4.16 0.27 4.04 4.19 4.34 
duration (10-year) 6.98 0.88 6.40 7.07 7.74 
Summary statistics of stock returns (basis point) 
CRSP vwght daily return 4.45 105.70 -42.39 7.71 54.01 
CRSP ewght daily return 8.15 82.99 -24.17 14.52 47.10 
SP500 vwght daily return 3.53 111.69 -48.26 4.81 56.90 
 
 
Panel C: Other data 
Summary statistics of Treasury options implied volatilities (%) (1982-2008) 
Implied Volatility  8.00 1.75 6.99 7.75 8.82 
Summary statistics of daily mutual fund flows (basis point) (1998-2008) 
daily flow to bond funds 0.40 15.31 -3.24 -0.02 3.33 
daily flow to equity funds -0.92 10.27 -5.09 -1.72 1.87 
daily flow to hybrid funds -0.19 11.06 -3.95 -0.06 3.49 
Summary statistics of General Collateral Repo rates (%) (1992-2008) 
overnight 3.97  1.63  2.90  4.49  5.31  
one week 3.96  1.63  2.92  4.53  5.30  
one month 3.97  1.63  2.90  4.52  5.30  
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Table II. Treasury Yields Around Subsequent Auctions 
 
This table reports the time-series average of ܻሺݐሻ െ ܻሺ0ሻ, which is the yield of an on-the-
run n-year Treasury note (n=2,5,10) on day t (where t ranges from -10 to 10) minus the 
yield of the same note on the day when a subsequent n-year note auction is conducted. 
(More precisely, the note is on-the-run before the auction and becomes off-the-run after 
the auction.) The sample period is from January 1980 to June 2008. All yields are 
expressed in basis points. T-statistics are based on standard errors that are Newey-West 
adjusted up to 12 lags, and are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate 
significance levels of 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. 
 
 
Treasury yields around subsequent auctions: ܻሺݐሻ െ ܻሺ0ሻ 
 2-year notes 5-year notes 10-year notes 
t  Mean t-value Mean t-value Mean t-value 
-10 -1.16 (-0.59) -2.68* (-1.87) -0.79 (-0.39) 
-9 -1.82 (-0.98) -2.50 (-1.60) -2.14 (-1.21) 
-8 -2.86 (-1.50) -3.35** (-2.43) -1.64 (-0.95) 
-7 -3.04* (-1.68) -2.61* (-1.95) -0.10 (-0.06) 
-6 -2.64* (-1.83) -2.07 (-1.54) -1.03 (-0.71) 
-5 -2.53* (-1.50) -2.67** (-2.50) -1.57 (-1.11) 
-4 -2.81* (-1.77) -2.96*** (-3.08) -2.76** (-2.02) 
-3 -3.01** (-2.21) -1.56* (-1.80) -2.25** (-2.04) 
-2 -2.06** (-2.03) -0.64 (-1.14) -0.41 (-0.52) 
-1 -1.77*** (-3.18) 0.30 (0.67) -0.78 (-1.20) 
1 -0.36 (-1.11) -0.77** (-2.02) -0.56 (-1.21) 
2 -0.67 (-1.09) -1.74*** (-2.88) -1.23 (-1.40) 
3 -0.87 (-0.97) -2.46*** (-2.97) -1.87* (-1.70) 
4 -1.92* (-1.94) -1.96** (-2.37) -2.01 (-1.62) 
5 -2.32** (-2.18) -2.74*** (-2.63) -2.00 (-1.51) 
6 -3.19** (-2.61) -2.11 (-1.58) -1.48 (-1.32) 
7 -2.93** (-2.14) -2.75 (-1.58) -2.78* (-1.70) 
8 -2.77 (-1.60) -3.41** (-2.10) -3.42* (-1.90) 
9 -3.19* (-1.74) -3.09* (-1.95) -4.47** (-2.07) 
10 -3.91** (-2.13) -2.95* (-1.88) -4.68** (-2.00) 
No. Obs. 332 210 132 
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Table III. Treasury Returns Around Subsequent Auctions 
 
This table reports the time-series average of ∆ܥܴሺݐሻ, which is the cumulative return of 
an on-the-run n-year Treasury note (n=2,5,10) during the t days after a subsequent n-
year note auction minus the cumulative return of the same n-year note during the t 
days before the auction, where t ranges from 1 to 10. (More precisely, the note is on-the-
run before the auction and becomes off-the-run after the auction.) The sample period is 
from January 1980 to June 2008. All returns are expressed in basis points. T-statistics 
are based on standard errors that are Newey-West adjusted up to 12 lags, and are 
reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significance levels of 1%, 5%, and 10%, 
respective. 
 
 
Treasury note returns around subsequent auctions: ∆ܥܴሺݐሻ 
 2-year notes 5-year notes 10-year notes 
t Mean t-value Mean t-value Mean t-value 
1 3.68*** (3.90) 1.98 (0.99) 8.61 (1.53) 
2 3.54** (2.21) 9.94*** (4.03) 10.87 (1.13) 
3 6.15** (2.42) 16.86*** (4.28) 26.37** (2.31) 
4 8.66*** (2.87) 20.86*** (4.34) 31.61*** (2.75) 
5 8.89*** (2.69) 22.54*** (3.67) 23.84* (1.78) 
6 10.20*** (3.62) 17.12** (2.07) 16.44 (1.31) 
7 9.42*** (2.63) 21.21** (2.20) 17.44 (1.01) 
8 9.61** (2.28) 27.59*** (3.01) 30.4* (1.67) 
9 9.08** (2.23) 22.85** (2.43) 40.68** (2.02) 
10 9.20** (2.02) 22.77** (2.53) 32.45 (1.39) 
No. Obs. 332 210 132 
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Table IV. Costs of Issuing Treasury Notes 
 
Panel A of this table presents the time-series average of ܻሺܣሻ െ തܻሺݐሻ, where ܻሺܣሻ is the 
auction yield of the newly issued Treasury notes, and തܻሺݐሻ is the average of the yield of 
the on-the-run n-year note (n=2,5,10) on day t before the subsequent auction and the 
yield of the same note on day t after the auction, with t ranging from 1 to 10. (More 
precisely, the note is on-the-run before the auction and becomes off-the-run after the 
auction.) The auction yield is the maximum winning yield for single-price auctions, and 
is the weighted-average yield based on the amount issued at each winning yield for 
multiple-price auctions. The sample period is from January 1980 to June 2008. Yields 
are expressed in basis points. Panel B of this table presents the estimated cost of issuing 
Treasury notes. The percentage cost is calculated as the product of ܻሺܣሻ െ തܻሺݐሻ and the 
duration of the notes and is expressed in basis points. The dollar amount cost is based 
on the Treasury securities issuance in 2007, the last full year in our sample, and is 
expressed in millions. T-statistics based on standard errors that are Newey-West 
adjusted up to 12 lags, are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significance 
levels of 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively.  
 
 
Panel A: Yield difference ܻሺܣሻ െ തܻሺݐሻ  
 2-year notes 5-year notes 10-year notes 
t Mean t-value Mean t-value Mean t-value 
1 3.63*** (5.77) 1.58** (2.63) 1.36* (1.84) 
2 3.90*** (5.40) 2.52*** (3.65) 1.52 (1.58) 
3 4.50*** (5.07) 3.42*** (4.36) 2.84** (2.26) 
4 4.84*** (4.88) 3.86*** (4.52) 3.19*** (3.13) 
5 4.90*** (4.62) 4.04*** (4.70) 2.66*** (3.12) 
6 5.33*** (5.98) 3.44*** (3.34) 2.21** (2.34) 
7 5.42*** (5.17) 3.95*** (3.01) 2.43* (1.65) 
8 5.38*** (4.18) 4.69*** (3.82) 3.59* (1.90) 
9 5.03*** (3.82) 4.06*** (3.41) 4.39** (2.07) 
10 5.05*** (3.42) 4.05*** (3.59) 3.85* (1.71) 
No. Obs. 332 210 132 
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Panel B: Costs of issuance based on the average yield on days -t and t 
 2-year notes 5-year notes 10-year notes All notes 
t Percentage  
(basis points) 
Amount  
(Millions) 
Percentage 
(basis points)
Amount 
(Millions)
Percentage 
(basis points)
Amount 
(Millions) 
Amount 
(Millions)
1 6.72 172 6.57 103 9.42 79 354 
2 7.22 185 10.48 164 10.53 88 437 
3 8.33 213 14.23 222 19.68 165 600 
4 8.95 229 16.06 251 22.11 186 665 
5 9.07 232 16.81 262 18.43 155 649 
6 9.86 252 14.31 223 15.32 129 604 
7 10.03 257 16.43 256 16.84 141 654 
8 9.95 255 19.51 304 24.88 209 768 
9 9.31 238 16.89 263 30.42 256 757 
10 9.34 239 16.85 263 26.68 224 726 
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Table V. Hedge Portfolio Returns 
 
This table presents ܪܴ݁ݐሺݐሻ, the cumulative return to a hedge strategy from t days 
before an auction to t days after, where t ranges from 1 to 10. On the tth day before 
each auction, we construct a hedge portfolio by going short in the on-the-run 2-year 
note, and going long in a duration-matched portfolio of the on-the-run 6-month T-bill 
and 10-year note. We hold this hedge portfolio until the auction day, and then reverse 
our positions: We now go long in the same 2-year note (which just becomes the first off-
the-run note) and go short in the duration-matched portfolio of the on-the-run 6-month 
T-bill and on-the-run 10-year note. We hold this portfolio until the tth day after the 
auction. The full sample period is from January 1980 to June 2008. Returns are 
expressed in basis points. Sharpe Ratio is the annualized Sharpe ratio for this trading 
strategy. T-statistics based on standard errors that are Newey-West adjusted up to 12 
lags, and are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significance levels of 1%, 
5%, and 10%, respectively.  
 
 
 
 
Panel A: Hedge portfolio returns ܪܴ݁ݐሺݐሻ Panel B: Hedge portfolio returns ܪܴ݁ݐሺݐሻ
 in the full sample (1980-2008)  in the period of 1998-2008 
t Mean t-value Sharpe Ratio t Mean t-value Sharpe Ratio
1 1.04* (1.67) 0.34 1 -0.40 (-0.47) -0.14 
2 2.40*** (2.89) 0.66 2 1.37 (1.60) 0.50 
3 4.41*** (3.35) 0.94 3 2.61*** (2.68) 0.84 
4 4.96*** (3.30) 0.98 4 4.15*** (4.01) 1.05 
5 5.87*** (3.10) 0.95 5 4.78*** (3.48) 1.06 
6 6.39*** (3.95) 1.05 6 6.85*** (4.66) 1.32 
7 8.17*** (4.00) 1.20 7 8.02*** (5.14) 1.56 
8 8.10*** (3.88) 1.12 8 7.62*** (4.64) 1.41 
9 8.24*** (3.60) 1.08 9 8.13*** (5.08) 1.44 
10 8.62*** (3.65) 1.08 10 8.52*** (4.95) 1.44 
No. Obs 319 No. Obs 116 
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Table VI. On-the-Run 10-Year Treasury Yields Around 2- and 5-Year Auctions 
 
This table reports the time-series average of ܻሺݐሻ െ ܻሺ0ሻ, which is the yield of an on-the-
run 10-year Treasury note on day t (where t ranges from -5 to 5) minus the yield of the 
same note on the day when a subsequent n-year note (n=2,5) auction is conducted. 
(More precisely, the note is on-the-run before the auction and becomes off-the-run after 
the auction.) We exclude 2- and 5- year note auctions that are within one week of any 
10-year note auction. The sample period is from January 1980 to June 2008. All yields 
are expressed in basis points. T-statistics based on standard errors that are Newey-West 
adjusted up to 12 lags, and are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate 
significance levels of 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. 
 
 
 
10-year Treasury yields around 2- and 5-year note auctions: ܻሺݐሻ െ ܻሺ0ሻ 
 around 2-year note auctions around 5-year note auctions 
t Mean t-value Mean t-value 
-5 -1.48 (-1.50) -2.71** (-2.26) 
-4 -1.44 (-1.61) -2.89** (-2.51) 
-3 -1.41* (-1.72) -1.57 (-1.60) 
-2 -0.96 (-1.63) -0.69 (-1.00) 
-1 -1.20*** (-2.70) 0.01 (0.01) 
1 -0.74* (-1.93) -0.22 (-0.42) 
2 -0.44 (-0.67) -2.12*** (-2.98) 
3 0.23 (0.22) -3.08*** (-4.18) 
4 -0.68 (-0.60) -2.31*** (-2.90) 
5 -0.8 (-0.61) -3.22*** (-3.00) 
No. Obs. 275 144 
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Table VII. The Effect of Dealers’ Risk-Bearing Capacity and Auction Size 
 
This table presents the effect of dealers’ risk-bearing capacity and auction size on 
Treasury security returns around subsequent auctions. The dependent variable in Panel 
A, ܪܴ݁ݐሺ10ሻ, is described in Table V. Offering Amount is the logarithm of the amount 
in dollars offered by the Treasury Department in the 2-year note auction. Implied 
Volatility is the model-free maturity-weighted implied volatility of nearest-to-expiry at-
the-money options on the 30-year, 10-year, and 5-year Treasury securities at the end of 
the previous month. The dependent variable in Panel B is the daily return of on-the-run 
2-year Treasury notes, adjusted by the average daily return in the 20-day windows 
surrounding it. ܱܵܫሺݐሻ  is the logarithm of the aggregate offering amount from all 
Treasury note auctions of any maturity type during the t days prior to the return date 
minus that during the t days subsequent to the return date. The sample period is 
January 1982 to June 2008 for Panel A and is January 1980 to June 2008 Panel B. T-
statistics based on standard errors that are Newey-West adjusted up to 12 lags, and are 
reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significance levels of 1%, 5%, and 10%, 
respectively. 
 
 
Panel A: Dependent Variable = ܪܴ݁ݐሺ10ሻ 
 Coefficient (*10000) t-value 
Offering Amount 4.58* (1.71) 
Implied Volatility 1.68** (2.28) 
 
 
 
Panel B: Dependent Variable = daily 2-year note return 
 Coefficient (*10000) t-value 
Dependent Variable = daily 2-year note return 
ܱܵܫሺ5ሻ 0.029*** (2.79) 
 
Dependent Variable = daily 2-year note return 
ܱܵܫሺ10ሻ 0.046*** (3.83) 
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Table VIII. Daily Mutual Fund Flows Around Treasury Auctions 
 
This table reports the time-series average of ∆ܨܮܱܹሺݐሻ, which is the cumulative daily 
investment flows during the t days subsequent to a 2-year Treasury note auction minus 
that during the t days prior to the auction, where t ranges from 1 to 10. The sample 
period is from January 1998 to June 2008. We examine capital flows to three types of 
mutual funds: bond mutual funds, equity mutual funds, and hybrid mutual funds. T-
statistics based on standard errors that are Newey-West adjusted up to 12 lags, and are 
reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significance levels of 1%, 5%, and 10%, 
respectively. 
 
 
 
Mutual fund flows around 2-year Treasury note auctions: ∆ܨܮܱܹሺݐሻ 
 bond funds equity funds hybrid funds 
t Mean t-value Mean t-value Mean t-value 
1 -0.03%** (-2.22) 0.00% (-0.37) -0.03%*** (-2.60) 
2 -0.02% (-1.11) 0.01% (0.52) -0.02% (-1.58) 
3 0.03%** (2.03) -0.01% (-0.32) -0.02% (-1.21) 
4 0.05%*** (3.01) -0.01% (-0.55) -0.01% (-0.73) 
5 0.06%*** (3.06) -0.02% (-0.84) -0.03% (-1.32) 
6 0.14%*** (2.82) -0.03% (-1.30) -0.05%* (-1.86) 
7 0.15%*** (2.87) -0.03% (-1.05) -0.05%* (-1.81) 
8 0.15%*** (2.95) -0.02% (-0.89) -0.05%* (-1.74) 
9 0.16%*** (3.15) -0.03% (-1.05) -0.04% (-1.14) 
10 0.16%*** (3.02) -0.04% (-1.29) -0.09%** (-2.16) 
No. Obs. 120 120 120 
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Table IX. Repo Rates Around Treasury Auctions 
 
This table reports the time-series average of ∆ܴ݁݌݋ሺݐሻ, which is the average repo rate 
during the t days subsequent to a 2-year Treasury note auction minus that during the t 
days prior to the auction, where t ranges from 1 to 10. The sample period is from 
January 1992 to June 2008. All repo contracts are backed by Government General 
Collaterals. Repo rates are expressed in basis points. T-statistics based on standard 
errors that are Newey-West adjusted up to 12 lags, and are reported in parentheses. ***, 
**, and * indicate significance levels of 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. 
 
 
 
Average repo rate around auctions: ∆ܴ݁݌݋ሺݐሻ 
 Overnight  One-week One-month 
t Mean t-value Mean t-value Mean t-value 
1 1.38 (0.99) 1.33 (1.50) -0.70* (-1.65) 
2 3.69** (2.39) 2.43*** (2.72) 0.11 (0.27) 
3 5.09*** (3.29) 3.78*** (3.84) 0.78 (1.62) 
4 6.53*** (4.53) 4.47*** (4.31) 1.11* (1.78) 
5 6.75*** (4.83) 4.39*** (4.36) 1.41** (2.03) 
6 6.50*** (4.67) 3.94*** (3.80) 1.08 (1.30) 
7 5.85*** (4.26) 3.41*** (3.22) 0.81 (0.86) 
8 4.85*** (3.49) 2.78** (2.28) 0.43 (0.37) 
9 4.13*** (2.79) 2.19 (1.59) 0.11 (0.08) 
10 3.47** (2.21) 1.68 (1.10) -0.19 (-0.12) 
No. Obs. 198 198 198 
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Table X. Stock Market Returns Around Treasury Auctions 
 
This table reports the time-series average of ∆ܥܴሺݐሻ, which is the cumulative return of 
the stock market during the t days after a 2-year Treasury note auction minus the 
cumulative return of the stock market during the t days before the auction, where t 
ranges from 1 to 10. Three types of market returns are examined here: the value-
weighted CRSP return, equal-weighted CRSP return, and value-weighted S&P500 index 
return. The sample period is from January 1980 to June 2008. All returns are expressed 
in basis points. T-statistics based on standard errors that are Newey-West adjusted up 
to 12 lags, and are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significance levels of 
1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. 
 
 
 
Stock market returns around 2-year note auctions: ∆ܥܴሺݐሻ  
 value-weighted CRSP equal-weighted CRSP value-weighted S&P500 
t Mean t-value Mean t-value Mean t-value 
1 -0.07% (-0.90) 0.04% (0.70) -0.10% (-1.17) 
2 0.03% (0.33) 0.35%*** (4.93) -0.06% (-0.49) 
3 0.16% (1.27) 0.44%*** (4.88) 0.07% (0.54) 
4 0.33%** (2.35) 0.39%*** (3.69) 0.28%* (1.86) 
5 0.49%*** (3.11) 0.50%*** (4.04) 0.41%** (2.50) 
6 0.52%*** (3.03) 0.65%*** (4.71) 0.40%** (2.28) 
7 0.48%*** (2.57) 0.79%*** (5.14) 0.32%* (1.68) 
8 0.46%** (2.31) 0.73%*** (4.19) 0.30% (1.49) 
9 0.45%** (2.19) 0.65%*** (3.52) 0.31% (1.46) 
10 0.29% (1.30) 0.55%*** (2.71) 0.13% (0.57) 
No. Obs. 332 332 332 
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Figure 1. Treasury Yields Around Auctions 
 
Solid lines in these figures correspond to the time-series average of ܻሺݐሻ െ ܻሺ0ሻ, which is 
the yield of the n-year Treasury note (n=2,5,10) on day t (where t ranges from -5 to 5) 
minus the yield of the same note on the day when a subsequent n-year note auction is 
conducted. (More precisely, the note is on-the-run before the auction and becomes off-
the-run after the auction.) The dotted lines are the 95% confidence interval. The top 
three figures are for on-the-run Treasury notes, and the bottom three figures are for the 
first off-the-run notes. The sample period is from January 1980 to June 2008. All yields 
are expressed in basis points. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
